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“A DECENT RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS OF [HUMAN]KIND”: 
THE VALUE OF A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION* 
RUTH BADER GINSBURG** 
South Africa’s 1996 Constitution famously provides in Section 39: “When 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court . . . must consider international law; and 
may consider foreign law.”1  Other modern Constitutions have similar 
provisions, India’s and Spain’s, for example.2  In the United States the 
question whether and when courts may seek enlightenment from the laws and 
decisions of other nations has provoked heated debate.  I will speak of that 
controversy in these remarks.  At the outset, I should disclose the view I have 
long held: If U.S. experience and decisions can be instructive to systems that 
have more recently instituted or invigorated judicial review for 
constitutionality, so we can learn from others including Canada, South Africa, 
and most recently the U. K. — now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and 
executive actions against charters securing basic rights. 
Exposing laws to judicial review for constitutionality was once uncommon 
outside the United States.  In the United Kingdom, not distant from France, 
Spain, Germany, and other civil law countries in this regard, court review of 
legislation for compatibility with a fundamental charter was considered off 
limits, undemocratic, irreconcilable with the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy.  That was once true of South Africa, is that not so?  But 
particularly in the years following World War II, many nations installed 
constitutional review by courts as one safeguard against oppressive 
government and stirred-up majorities.3  National, multinational, and 
international human rights charters and courts today play a prominent part in 
 
* Address given to the Constitutional Court of South Africa, February 7, 2006.  An Earlier 
version of this address is published in the Proceedings of the 99th Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law, Cambridge Law Journal, and Florida International 
University Law Review. 
** Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. 
 1. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 39. 
 2. INDIA CONST. art. 51; C.E. [Constitution] (Spain) art. 10. 
 3. See Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38, 46 (Louis Henkin 
& Albert J. Rosenthal eds., Columbia Univ. Press 1990). 
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our world.  The U. S. judicial system will be the poorer, I have urged, if we do 
not both share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with values 
and a commitment to democracy similar to our own. 
In the value I place on comparative dialogue — on sharing with and 
learning from others — I draw on counsel from the founders of the United 
States.  The drafters and signers of the Declaration of Independence cared 
about the opinions of other peoples; they placed before the world the reasons 
why the States, joining together to become the United States of America, were 
impelled to separate from Great Britain.  The Declarants stated their reasons 
out of “a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.”4  They set out in the 
Declaration a long list of grievances, in order to submit the “Facts” — the 
“long Train of [the British Crown’s] Abuses” — to the scrutiny of “a candid 
World.”5 
The U. S. Supreme Court, early on, expressed a complementary view: The 
judicial power of the United States, the Court said in 1816, includes cases “in 
the correct adjudication of which foreign nations are deeply interested . . . 
[and] in which the principles of the law and comity of nations often form an 
essential inquiry.”6  “Far from [exhibiting hostility] to foreign countries’ views 
or laws,” Professor Vicki Jackson of the Georgetown University law faculty 
recently reminded us: “[T]he founding generation showed concern for how 
adjudication in our courts would affect other countries’ regard for the United 
States.”7  A similar concern is evident today in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa.  As Justice O’Regan put 
it, writing separately in Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Africa: 
“[O]ur Constitution recognises and asserts that, after decades of isolation, 
South Africa is now a member of the community of nations, and a bearer of 
obligations and responsibilities in terms of international law.”8  Even more so 
than when the United States was a new nation, the USA today, no less than 
South Africa, is subject to the scrutiny of “a candid World.” 
John Jay, one of the authors of The Federalist Papers promoting 
ratification of the U. S. Constitution and George Washington’s appointee as 
first Chief Justice of the United States, wrote of the new nation in 1793 much 
as Justice O’Regan did in 2004 of the new Republic.  The United States, Jay 
 
 4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 5. Favoreu, supra note 3, at ¶ 2. 
 6. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816). 
 7. Vicki C. Jackson, Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk with You, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, 
43, 44.  See also Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: 
Hearing on H.R. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (2004) (statement of Professor Vicki C. Jackson) 
[hereinafter Jackson Statement]. 
 8. Kaunda v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., 2004 (10) BCLR 1009 (CC) at ¶ 222 (S. 
Afr.). 
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observed, “by taking a place among the nations of the earth, bec[a]me 
amenable to the laws of nations,” the core of what we today call international 
law.9  Eleven years later, the great Chief Justice John Marshall cautioned: 
“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations 
if any other possible construction remains.”10  South Africa installed just such 
a guide in its 1996 Constitution.  Section 233 instructs: “When interpreting . . . 
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation . . . consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation . . . inconsistent with 
international law.”11 
True, there are generations-old and still persistent discordant views on 
recourse to the “Opinions of Mankind.”  A mid-19th century U. S. Chief 
Justice expressed opposition to such recourse in an extreme statement.  He 
wrote: 
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling . . . 
in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the [U. S. 
Supreme Court] to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal 
construction . . . than they were intended to bear when the instrument was 
framed and adopted.12 
Those words were penned in 1857.  They appear in Chief Justice Roger 
Taney’s opinion for a divided Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, an infamous 
opinion that invoked the majestic Due Process Clause to uphold one human’s 
right to hold another in bondage.  The Dred Scott decision declared that no 
“descendants of Africans [imported into the United States], and sold as slaves” 
could ever become citizens of the United States.13 
While the Civil War and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the U. S. Constitution reversed the Dred Scott judgment, U. S. 
jurists and political actors today divide sharply on the propriety of looking 
beyond our nation’s borders, particularly on matters touching fundamental 
human rights.  Some have expressed spirited opposition.  Justice Scalia 
counsels: The Court “should cease putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the 
reasoned basis of its decisions.  To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s 
own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but 
sophistry.”14 
Another trenchant critic, Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, commented not long ago: “To cite foreign law 
 
 9. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793). 
 10. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 11. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 233. 
 12. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857). 
 13. Id. at 403. 
 14. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original removed). 
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as authority is to flirt with the discredited . . . idea of a universal natural law; or 
to suppose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single, elite 
community of wisdom and conscience.”15  Judge Posner’s view rests, in part, 
on the concern that U. S. judges do not comprehend the social, historical, 
political, and institutional background from which foreign opinions emerge.  
Nor do we even understand the language in which laws and judgments, outside 
the common law realm, are written. 
Judge Posner is right, of course, to this extent: Foreign opinions are not 
authoritative; they set no binding precedent for the U. S. judge.  But they can 
add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions.  Yes, 
we should approach foreign legal materials with sensitivity to our differences, 
deficiencies, and imperfect understanding, but imperfection, I believe, should 
not lead us to abandon the effort to learn what we can from the experience and 
good thinking foreign sources may convey.16 
Representative of the perspective I share with four of my current 
colleagues, Patricia M. Wald, once Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit and former Judge on the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, last year said with characteristic 
wisdom: “It’s hard for me to see that the use of foreign decisional law is an up-
or-down proposition.  I see it rather as a pool of potential and useful 
information and thought that must be mined with caution and restraint.”17 
Many current members of the U.S. Congress would terminate all debate 
over whether federal courts should refer to foreign or international legal 
materials.  For the most part, they would respond to the question with a 
resounding “No.”  Two identical Resolutions reintroduced last year, one in the 
House of Representatives and the other in the Senate, declare that “judicial 
interpretations regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United States 
should not be based . . . on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign 
institutions unless such [materials] inform an understanding of the original 
meaning of the Constitution.”18  As of December 2005, the House Resolution 
had attracted support from eighty-three cosponsors.  Two 2005-proposed Acts 
would do more than “resolve.”  They would positively prohibit federal courts, 
when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, from referring to “any constitution, 
law, administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or 
any other action of any foreign state or international organization or agency, 
other than English constitutional and common law up to the time of the 
 
 15. Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., Jul.-Aug. 
2004, at 40, 42. 
 16. Judge Posner acknowledged that decisions elsewhere might have informational value; 
they might be useful, he thought, if they contain persuasive reasoning.  Id. at 41. 
 17. Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 
27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 439 (2004). 
 18. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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adoption of the [U.S. Constitution].”19  [Even reference to a Scottish verdict, 
i.e., a verdict of not proved, it seems, would be out of order.] 
These measures recycle similar resolutions and bills proposed before the 
2004 elections in the United States, but never put to a vote.  Although I doubt 
the current measures will garner sufficient votes to pass, it is disquieting that 
they have attracted sizable support.  And one not-so-small concern — they fuel 
the irrational fringe.  A personal example.  The U. S. Supreme Court’s Marshal 
alerted Justice O’Connor and me to a February 28, 2005, web posting on a 
“chat” site.  It opened: 
Okay commandoes, here is your first patriotic assignment . . . an easy one.  
Supreme Court Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor have publicly stated that they 
use [foreign] laws and rulings to decide how to rule on American cases. 
This is a huge threat to our Republic and Constitutional freedom. . . .  If you 
are what you say you are, and NOT armchair patriots, then those two justices 
will not live another week. 
Nearly a year has passed since that posting.  Justice O’Connor, though to my 
great sorrow retired just last week from the Court’s bench, remains alive and 
well.  As for me, you can judge for yourself. 
To a large extent, I believe, the critics in Congress and in the media 
misperceive how and why U. S. courts refer to foreign and international court 
decisions.  We refer to decisions rendered abroad, it bears repetition, not as 
controlling authorities, but for their indication, in Judge Wald’s words, of 
“common denominators of basic fairness governing relationships between the 
governors and the governed.”20 
In a November 2005 Harvard Law Review comment, Georgetown’s 
Professor Jackson usefully identified three responses to transnational sources: 
resistance, convergence, and engagement.21  South Africa’s apartheid regime 
fit the “Resistance Model,” an approach that “relishes resistance . . . to outside 
influence.”22  Professor Jackson suggested that South Africa’s 1996 
Constitution fits the “Convergence Model,” in that it “explicitly incorporate[s] 
international law as a controlling legal norm.”23  But perhaps the 
Constitutional Court’s emerging jurisprudence comes closer to the third 
approach, the “Engagement Model.”  That Model comprehends transnational 
sources “as interlocutors,” a means to test “understanding of one’s own 
 
 19. Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. Res. 1070, 109th Cong. §201 (2005); 
Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. Res. 520, 109th Cong. §201 (2005). 
 20. Wald, supra note 21, at 442. 
 21. Vicki C. Jackson, Comment, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 112-115 (2005). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 113. 
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traditions and possibilities by examining them in the [reflected light cast by 
other legal systems].”24 
The jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional Court offers many 
examples, among them, Justice Kriegler’s cautionary note in Sanderson v. 
Attorney-General, Eastern Cape.25  The question in that case: Did a two-year 
delay in bringing a prosecution for alleged sexual offenses violate the 
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.26  In determining that the 
defendant’s rights were not violated, Justice Kriegler canvassed foreign 
precedents, especially U. S. and Canadian decisions; he prefaced his 
examination, however, by warning that “the use of foreign precedent requires 
circumspection.”27  In State v. Makwanyane, then Chief Justice Chaskalson 
earlier cautioned, in presenting his comparative survey decisions on capital 
punishment: “We can derive assistance from . . . foreign case law, but we are 
in no way bound to follow it.”28  I agree.  Some U. S. practices, I fully 
appreciate, are not suitably exported: the use of juries in civil cases is one 
example. 
In testimony prepared for a congressional hearing, Professor Jackson made 
a point critics of comparative sideglances perhaps overlook: the “negative 
authority” foreign experience sometimes may have.29  She referred in this 
regard to the “Steel Seizure Case” decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in 
1952.30  There, Justice Jackson, in his separate opinion, pointed to features of 
the Weimar Constitution in Germany that allowed Adolf Hitler to assume 
dictatorial powers.31  He contrasted Germany’s situation with that of Great 
Britain, a country in which legislative authorization was required for the 
exercise of emergency powers.32  Justice Jackson drew from that comparison 
support for the conclusion that, without more specific congressional 
authorization, the U. S. President could not seize private property (in that case, 
the steel mills) even in aid of a war effort.33  The U. S. President’s wartime 
authority, you no doubt know, is today a hotly debated issue in U. S. political 
and legal circles. 
At the time Justice Jackson cast a comparative sideglance at Weimar 
Germany, the United States itself was a source of “negative authority.”  The 
Attorney General pressed that point in an amicus brief for the United States in 
 
 24. Id. at 114. 
 25. 1997 (12) BCLR 1675 (CC) (S.Afr.). 
 26. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 26. 
 28. 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at ¶ 39 (S. Afr.). 
 29. Jackson Statement, supra note 8, at 15. 
 30. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 31. Id. at 651 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 32. Id. at 651-52. 
 33. Id. at 652-55. 
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Brown v. Board of Education.34  Urging the Court to put an end to the 
“separate but equal doctrine,” the Attorney General wrote: 
  The existence of discrimination against minority groups in the United 
States has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries.  Racial 
discrimination . . . raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity 
of our devotion to the democratic faith.35 
The U. S. Constitution, Justice Scalia has remarked, contains no instruction 
resembling South Africa’s Section 39 prescription.  So U.S. courts, he thinks, 
have no warrant from our fundamental instrument of government to consider 
foreign law.  I would demur to that observation.  Judges in the United States 
are free to consult all manner of commentary — Restatements, Treatises, what 
law professors or even law students write copiously in law reviews, for 
example.  If we can consult those writings, why not the analysis of a question 
similar to the one we confront contained in an opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the German Constitutional 
Court, or the European Court of Human Rights? 
A case in point.  On December 16, 2004, in a controversy precipitated by 
the fight against terrorism, the Lords of Appeal (the U.K. counterpart to the 
U. S. Supreme Court) issued a way paving decision, one that looks beyond the 
United Kingdom’s borders.36  The case was brought by aliens held in custody 
in Belmarsh Prison.  A nine-member panel ruled, 8-to-1, that the British 
government’s indefinite detention of foreigners suspected of terrorism, without 
charging or trying them, is incompatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights, incorporated into domestic law by the U. K. Human Rights 
Act.  Lord Bingham’s lead opinion draws not only on domestic decisions and 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.  It also refers to opinions of 
the Supreme Court of Canada and U. S. Court of Appeals opinions (although 
not U. S. Supreme Court opinions).  Finding the differential treatment of 
nationals and non-nationals impermissible under the Human Rights Act, Lord 
Bingham also referred to several U.N. instruments, commencing with the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and including the 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.37 
Lord Bingham did make the observation, gently, that contemporary “U. S. 
authority does not provide evidence of general international practice.”38  That 
comment may have figured in the New York Times’ characterization of the 
Lords’ ruling as “a strong example of the increasing interdependence of 
 
 34. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Board of Education, 347. U.S. 
483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). 
 35. Id. at 6. 
 36. A(FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. [2004] UKHL 56. 
 37. Id. at ¶¶ 35-40, 58-62 (opinion of Lord Bingham). 
 38. Id. at ¶ 69. 
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domestic and international law, at least outside of the United States.”39  
Parliament reacted swiftly to the Lord’s decision.  In March 2005, it enacted a 
measure allowing placement of terrorist suspects under a highly restrictive 
form of house arrest, in lieu of imprisonment, again without charging or trying 
them.40 
One year later, in December 2005, the Law Lords resolved another 
headline case involving the Belmarsh detainees.41  A seven-member panel 
ruled unanimously that evidence obtained through torture was inadmissible in 
British courts to establish criminal liability or eligibility for deportation 
“irrespective of where, by whom or on whose authority the torture was 
inflicted.”42  Lord Bingham’s lead opinion again surveyed U.N. instruments, 
including the Convention against Torture, as well as judicial decisions from 
other nations, including the United States, Germany, and Israel.43  These 
sources afforded confirmation for his ringing declaration: “[T]he English 
common law has regarded torture and its fruits with abhorrence for over 500 
years, and that abhorrence is now shared by over 140 countries which have 
acceded to the Torture Convention.”44  Some of the Lords’ speeches cast a 
critical eye across the sea.  Lord Hoffmann ventured that “many people in the 
United States, heirs to the common law tradition, have felt their country 
dishonoured by its use of torture outside the jurisdiction.”45 
Later in December, recognizing the nation’s obligations under the 
Convention against Torture, the U. S. Congress banned cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment of detainees in U. S. custody.46  The legislation, however, 
stops short of explicitly banning evidence elicited by torture from 
consideration by a military tribunal charged with determining whether a 
detainee is an enemy combatant. 
The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United 
States in grappling with hard questions, as my quotation from Chief Justice 
Taney suggested, is in line with the view of the U. S. Constitution as a 
document essentially frozen in time as of the date of its ratification.  I am not a 
partisan of that view.  U. S. jurists honor the Framers’ intent “to create a more 
perfect Union,” I believe, if they read the Constitution as belonging to a global 
21st century, not as fixed forever by 18th-century understandings. 
 
 39. Lizette Alavarez, British Court Says Detentions Violate Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2004, at A1. 
 40. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 1 (Eng.). 
 41. A(FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. [2005] UKHL 71. 
 42. Id. at ¶ 10 (opinion of Lord Bingham). 
 43. Id. at ¶¶ 30-33, 36-39. 
 44. Id. at ¶ 51. 
 45. Id. at ¶ 82 (opinion of Lord Hoffmann). 
 46. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739 (2006) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)). 
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A key 1958 plurality opinion, Trop v. Dulles, makes just that point.47  At 
issue in that case, whether stripping a wartime deserter of citizenship violated 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.”48  “The 
basic concept underlying the . . . Amendment,” the opinion observed, “is 
nothing less than the dignity of man.”49  Therefore the Constitution’s text 
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”50  In that regard, the plurality reported: “The 
civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not 
to be imposed as punishment for crime.”51  (The primacy of human dignity 
notably is not left to inference in South Africa’s Constitution, for Section 10 
prescribes: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected.”)52 
Turning from frozen-in-time interpretation, I will take up another shortfall 
or insularity in current U. S. jurisprudence, at least as I see it.  The Bill of 
Rights, few would disagree, is the hallmark and pride of the United States.  
One might therefore assume that it guides and controls U. S. officialdom 
wherever in the world they carry the flag of the United States or their 
credentials.  But that is not the currently prevailing view.  For example, absent 
an express ban by treaty, a U. S. officer may abduct a foreigner and forcibly 
transport him to the United States to stand trial.  The U. S. Supreme Court so 
held, 6-to-3, in 1992.53  Just a year earlier, South Africa’s Supreme Court of 
Appeal had ruled the other way.54  It determined that under South Africa’s 
common law, a trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a case against a defendant 
when the State had acted lawlessly in apprehending him by participating in an 
abduction across international borders. 
Another case in point, one in which I was a participant, involving civil 
litigation: interpreting U. S. Supreme Court precedent, a divided U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in 1989, during my tenure on 
that court, that foreign plaintiffs acting abroad — plaintiffs were Indian family 
planning organizations — had no First Amendment rights, and therefore no 
standing to assert a violation of such rights by U. S. officials.55  In particular, 
the Indian organizations complained of a condition on U. S. grant money: the 
recipients could not engage in any abortion counseling, even in a separate 
 
 47. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 48. Id. at 87. 
 49. Id. at 100. 
 50. Id. at 101. 
 51. Id. at 102. 
 52. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 10. 
 53. United States v. Alavarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657, 670 (1992). 
 54. State v. Ebahim, 1991 (2) SALR 533 (A) at 568 (S. Afr.). 
 55. DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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entity funded by non-U. S. sources.56  In dissent, I resisted the notion that in an 
encounter between the United States and the people of another land, “the 
amendment we prize as ‘first’ has no force in court.”57  I expressed the 
expectation that the position taken in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations would one day accurately describe our law.  “[W]herever the United 
States acts,” the Restatement projects, “it can only act in accordance with the 
limitations imposed by the Constitution.”58 
Returning to my main theme, I will recount briefly and chronologically the 
Supreme Court’s most recent decisions involving foreign or international legal 
sources as an aid to the resolution of constitutional questions.  In a headline 
2002 decision, Atkins v. Virginia, a six-member majority (all save the Chief 
Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas) held unconstitutional the execution of 
a mentally retarded offender.59  The Court noted that “within the world 
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”60  (South Africa, 
of course, figures prominently in the worldwide disapproval, the Constitutional 
Court having held a decade ago that capital punishment in any case is 
unconstitutional.) 
New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse wrote of the following, 2002–
2003, Term: The Court has “displayed a [steadily growing] attentiveness to 
legal developments in the rest of the world and to the [C]ourt’s role in keeping 
the United States in step with them.”61  Among examples from that Term, I 
would include the Michigan University affirmative action cases decided June 
23, 2003.62  Although the Court splintered, it upheld the Michigan Law School 
program.63  In separate opinions, I looked to two United Nations Conventions: 
the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
which the United States has ratified; and the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which, sadly, the 
United States has not yet ratified.64  Both Conventions distinguish between 
impermissible policies of oppression or exclusion, and permissible policies of 
inclusion, “temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto 
 
 56. Id. at 278. 
 57. Id. at 308 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 58. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF  THE UNITED STATES § 
721 n.1 (1987) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (plurality opinion)). 
 59. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 60. Id. at 317 n.21. 
 61. Linda Greenhouse, In a Momentous Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A1. 
 62. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 63. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
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equality.”65  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Michigan Law School 
case, I observed, “accords with the international understanding of the [purpose 
and propriety] of affirmative action.”66  (South Africa’s Constitution is clear 
on that matter; Section 9(2) provides: “To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may 
be taken.”)67 
A better indicator from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2002–2003 Term, 
because it attracted a majority, is Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas, announced June 26, 2003.68  Overruling a 1986 decision, 
Lawrence declared unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting two adult 
persons of the same sex from engaging, voluntarily, in intimate sexual conduct.  
(I think it highly unlikely, however, that we will soon see a U. S. Supreme 
Court decision resembling the very recent decision of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie.)69  On the question of 
dynamic versus static, frozen-in-time constitutional interpretation, the Court’s 
Lawrence v. Texas opinion instructs: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in 
its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.  They did not 
presume to have this insight.  They knew times can blind us to certain truths 
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in 
fact serve only to oppress.  As the Constitution endures, persons in every 
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.70 
On respect for “the Opinions of [Human]kind,” the Lawrence Court 
emphasized: “The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an 
integral part of human freedom in many other countries.”71  In support, the 
Court cited the leading 1981 European Court of Human Rights decision, 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, and subsequent European Human Rights Court 
decisions affirming the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in 
intimate, consensual conduct.72 
In the 2003–2004 Term, foreign and international legal sources again 
figured in several decisions.  These included, most notably, two June 2004 
 
 65. Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, ¶ 4(1), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. 
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decisions in cases arising out of the war on terror.  One, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
concerned a U. S. citizen, held incommunicado in a Navy brig in South 
Carolina pursuant to an executive decree declaring him an “enemy 
combatant.”73  Ruling some six months before the Law Lords’ decision in the 
2004 Belmarsh case, the Court held, 8-to-1, that the petitioner was entitled to a 
“meaningful opportunity” to contest the factual basis for his detention before 
an impartial adjudicator.74  Even in “our most challenging and uncertain 
moments” when “our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely 
tested,” Justice O’Connor wrote for a four-Justice plurality, “we must preserve 
our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”75  
“[H]istory and common sense,” she reminded, “teach us that an unchecked 
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and 
abuse.”76  On that theme, the U.K.’s Lord Hoffmann wrote in his separate 
opinion in the 2004 Belmarsh case: 
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in 
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from 
terrorism but from laws [or executive measures, such as the one at issue in 
Belmarsh, authorizing indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial].  That is 
the true measure of what terrorism may achieve.77 
He hoped, after the Lords of Appeal ruling, that Parliament would not “give 
the terrorists such a victory.”78  I should add that two University of Chicago 
Law School professors, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, recently 
inveighed against Justice O’Connor’s and Lord Hoffmann’s statements as 
“absurdities.”79  People do not prefer liberty to death, they urged.  A 
government that does not contract civil liberties in the face of terrorist threats, 
they said, “is pathologically rigid, not enlightened.”80  They queried whether 
the Lords would have come out the same way had the terrorist carnage in 
London’s underground preceded the Belmarsh decision.81  The Law Lords, I 
note, have not relented.  Their December 2005 decision excluding evidence 
obtained through torture post-dates the London underground bombing. 
The other “enemy combatant” case decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in 
June 2004, Rasul v. Bush, held that U. S. courts have jurisdiction to consider 
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challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured in 
hostilities abroad, then transported to the U. S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.82  The Court wrote narrowly; it said nothing about what claims, if any, 
would succeed once the detainees get to a federal court.  [Britain’s Lord Steyn, 
before this decision, called Guantanamo a “legal black hole.”]83  The Supreme 
Court has so far written only chapter one on the Guantanamo Bay 
incarcerations.  Federal district court judges have split on chapter two.  One 
judge held that foreigners detained at Guantanamo Bay, though they had 
access to court, could gain no judicial relief.84  Another ruled that the detainees 
were entitled to a fair hearing on the question whether their incarceration meets 
due process demands.85  Both cases are currently on appeal. 
Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case, titled 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, posing these questions: (1) Does the President have 
authority to establish a military commission to try Guantanamo Bay detainees 
for alleged war crimes; and (2) Is the writ of habeas corpus in federal court an 
available means to determine Guantanamo Bay detainees’ alleged rights under 
the 1949 Geneva Convention?86  The December 2005 legislation I earlier 
mentioned severely narrows Guantanamo Bay detainees’ access to courts.  The 
impact of that legislation on Hamdan’s petition, and on scores of filings in the 
federal district court in the District of Columbia, remains uncertain. 
To conclude my account of recent decisions in which the U. S. Supreme 
Court cast comparative sideglances, the March 2005 decision in Roper v. 
Simmons presents perhaps the fullest expressions to date on the propriety and 
utility of looking to “the opinions of [human]kind.”87  Holding unconstitutional 
the execution of persons under the age of 18 when they committed capital 
crimes, the Court declared it fitting to acknowledge “the overwhelming weight 
of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty.”88  Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the Court that the opinion of the world community provides 
“respected and significant confirmation of our own conclusions.”89  “It does 
not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution,” he explained, to recognize “the 
express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and 
peoples.”90  (Among the dozens of amici curiae submissions in Roper, an 
impressive brief bears the names of several Nobel Peace Prize winners, 
including former U. S. President Jimmy Carter, South Africa’s former 
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President Willem de Klerk, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu.  The Nobel 
laureates urged the Court to “consider the opinion of the international 
community, which has rejected the death penalty for child offenders 
worldwide.”)91 
[Justice O’Connor, although she dissented from the Court’s categorical 
ruling in Roper, agreed with the Court on the relevance of “foreign and 
international law [to an] assessment of evolving standards of decency.”92  The 
other dissenters, for whom Justice Scalia spoke, vigorously contended that 
foreign and international law have no place in determining what punishments 
are “cruel and unusual” within the meaning of the U. S. Constitution’s Eighth 
Amendment.]93 
Recognizing that forecasts are risky, I nonetheless believe the U. S. 
Supreme Court will continue to accord “a decent Respect to the Opinions of 
[Human]kind” as a matter of comity and in a spirit of humility.  Comity, 
because projects vital to our well-being — combating international terrorism is 
a prime example — require trust and cooperation of nations the world over.  
And humility because, in Justice O’Connor’s words: “Other legal systems 
continue to innovate, to experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal 
problems that arise each day, from which we can learn and benefit.”94 
In this regard, I was impressed by an observation made in September 2003 
by Israel’s Chief Justice Aharon Barak.  September 11th, he noted, confronts 
the United States with the dilemma of conducting a war on terrorism without 
sacrificing the nation’s most cherished values, including our respect for human 
dignity.  “We in Israel,” Barak said, “have our September 11, and September 
12 and so on.”95  He spoke of his own Court’s efforts to balance the 
government’s no doubt compelling need to secure the safety of the State and of 
its citizens on the one hand, and the nation’s high regard for “human dignity 
and freedom on the other hand.”96  He referred, particularly, to a question 
presented to his Court: “Is it lawful to use violence (less euphemistically, 
torture) in interrogat[ing] [a] terrorist in a ‘ticking bomb’ situation.”97  His 
Court’s answer: No, “[n]ever use violence.”  He elaborated: 
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[It] is the fate of democracy [that] not all means are acceptable to it, . . . not all 
methods employed by its enemies are open to it.  Sometimes, a democracy 
must fight with one hand tied behind its back.  Nonetheless, it has the upper 
hand.  Preserving the rule of law and recognition of individual liberties 
constitute an important component of [a democracy’s] understanding of 
security.  At the end of the day, [those values buoy up] its spirit and strength 
[and its capacity to] overcome [the] difficulties.98 
In that opinion, I concur without reservation. 
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